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Nguyen Dinh Tu’s interview (Part 4)
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Nguyen Dinh Tu, pen name Nguyen Tu, is a famous correspondent of Chinh Luan, one of the most prestigious daily news of Vietnam before 1975.
The interview was on 05/07/2003 in Alexandria, Virginia
Interviewer: Le Manh Hung, historian, author of Vietnamese History In Retrospect.
Translated by Phan Le Dung.
Nguyen Đinh Tu’s interview (Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5)
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Nguyễn Đình Tú 4 –VP-LMH-A070
LMH: Let me ask you, uncle, when you came to Hanoi in 1953, what did you do for Nguyen Huu Tri?
NT: Then I was in Saigon, I was teaching and staying with Pham Chu, a friend. He and I were very close. I was teaching when there was news that Tran Nhu Thuan, Governor Nguyen Huu Tri ‘s Rural Pacification commissioner came to the South. I had never met Thuan. When he was about to come to the South, he informed those who were working with him in Hanoi like Ung, Hoi, and a few other comrades. I received a letter from Ung informing me about Thuan ‘s coming. When he arrived, I invited him to my hotel. The hotel was a Chinese hotel, right at the gate of Hoa Binh market, inside what is now Cho Lon. Then that zone was the place the French took, from the requisition order, to use as their camp before. But they returned it afterward. The place was turned into a commercial and residential zone. Hoa Binh hotel was built then. The Palace Cinema was then built next to it. I stayed there with Pham Chu when Thuan came. I took him to the hotel, and rented a room there for him. He told me that my comrades in Hanoi needed my help and asked me to come to Hanoi to assist them. I actually did not want to go. I asked: And what are you doing? He said: Rural Pacification Office, and Governor Tri appointed me to be the Pacification Commissioner, meaning I am the number two man after him. We have quite a few comrades working in Pacification efforts namely Ung, Hoi, Phan and a few others, quite many. I asked: and their jobs? Thuan said, Well, each goes out to province, works side by side with the Province head, working and monitoring the province head regarding the pacification efforts at that province, ensuring everything goes as planned according to the plan at the Governor ‘s office. And secondly, the staff member can also propose new ideas, serving as adviser to the province head. He may, for example, advise whether to do this or not to do that. I asked whether those cadres, doing the Pacification dutie,s had any Pacification training class prior to their assignments? Thuan stopped, and seemed surprised by that question. He responded that we have our own formulas, our own regulations handed out to the cadres to read before going out for assignments. I asked, what criteria each pacification cadre is required to have? What level of education? What special governing experiences? And what governing techniques should be used as basis, such as all the province mandarins must have training prior to assuming actual responsibilities. Do we really have something similar? He said, No. Indeed, this is urgent, very urgent so we put our faith in your competitiveness. We just set the regulations, the plans, the programs at the Governor ‘s office and then it ‘s up to the cadre to apply those plans and programs. So do these Pacification cadres have any say about Mr. Governor ‘s plans and programs? He said, possibly yes. Since the cadres do have their ideas. If you do have ideas, just inform us. We will review and revise. And what about the current Pacification plan in the North? How do we proceed? What are our means? What ‘s the relationship between the Pacification cadre with the Governor’s office and the province heads? He said, First, you work directly with us (meaning with the Governor via him, the Pacification Commissioner, without any middle agent). Second, you work directly with the province head, but not under him. As the Governor’s order, you work beside him, but not under him. I asked, Pacification is a large project, within that large project there are many parts, such as political, administrative, and military. In addition, in the province, there is always a French, either military or civilian. And what is the relationship between the province head with the French military personnels, and there are also Vietnamese units there. Can cadres work directly with the French, or the district head when necessary? He said, the cadres have authority with the Vietnamese units. For example, when talking to a district head, a cadre can offer his ideas, or when there are more delicate issues, a cadre can send us his report. We, at Hanoi, will send out orders to the province head. As far as military matters is concerned, you have that perspective, since you were trained as a military officer. Those cadres who have the military training would assume an additional duty: To observe the military system and note the developments on the French side. If you have suggestions or special assessments then you can send your report to the Governor’s office. I asked: So all the Pacification cadres are required to have such military backgrounds? He said: No. Some of the cadres do not have that background. Since you belong to a special group of cadres that do have military backgrounds, we thought we would invite you since the Pacification efforts now include that part as well. Then he asked: Now, would you be able to join us in Hanoi? I said: Well, please give me time to think. Also, I don’t think you can return to Hanoi yet. Please hang around here for a few days since I still have a lot more questions to ask.
LMH: Finally, when you accepted and went to Hanoi, what was your assessment of the situation there?
NT: Seeing me so hesitant, Thuan opened his briefcase taking out the documents he brought with him and presented to me: Here ‘s ordre de mission with the Governor ‘s signature already on it. I laughed and said: So, you, gentlemen, are forcing me? He said: No, this just shows that we need you. The Ordre de mission was pre-signed by the Governor. He asked me to present it to you, so you know you are formally invited to Hanoi. If I were to go there and found out that the duties are beyond my ability, would I be able to return to Saigon? Thuan said: If you think it ‘s beyond you, and you would like to return then the return ticket will be available. There would be no problem at all. We thought you would understand more when you meet with our comrades in Hanoi. And then he gave me Ung’s letter. In that letter there were a few lines from Hoi and a few others. Everyone urged me to go. I said I would answer him the next day. Thuan stayed there, still having lunch and dinner with me. The next day I said I accepted the invitation. I told Pham Chu that I had accepted the invitation to go to Hanoi. It was the end of 1953 then. It was already winter in the North. After arriving at Hanoi, I went to the Governor’s office to meet my comrades. It took me a week to visit my comrades and ask about the organization. The organization was just a straight line. From the Governor down to Commissioner Tran Nhu Thuan, and then directly to the Pacification cadres. So this Pacification staff became the exclusive tools of the Governor.
LMH: And your assessment of the Pacification efforts?
NT: When I arrived in Hanoi, brother Thuan, –brother Tran Nhu Thuan called a meeting with all members. Then he said, these provinces have already been assigned, and these are the ones which have not. You may choose among the unassigned provinces. I smiled and said: No, I will not choose. I came here to accept duty. If there is a province that the Governor thinks the most deeply in trouble, I would like to be assigned to that province. Mr. Thuan did not respond right away. Three days later, he asked me to his office so we could have a private talk. Thuan said: It ‘s up to you whether you prefer to take or decline the field assignment to go to a province, but Governor Tri thinks there is another important task: Assemble young men at various hamlets in a place to train them. The training of course is military, but should also focus on how to defend a village. The aim is to train these young men on how to use rifles and how to patrol around their villages. The Governor has proposed that idea. Do you think you would prefer to take on this duty? I asked immediately: Is this a new thing or something that has already started? He said, No, it has not started yet. Because we need someone like you. If you agree to take on this duty, then we will send out circulars to all other provinces, villages, hamlets to assemble young men. Will you accept this duty? I said, If that is the case, then I will accept. Please show me the training location. He said, this training location, let me inform you first, is right at the front line where the Viet Minh are. The location is at Dap Cau, you would be on this side of the river, and the Viet Minh the other. You are only a river away from the Viet Minh. There is a French camp about to be abandoned. Mr. Governor intends to use that place for training. Does that sound acceptable to you? I said, it ‘s acceptable. Training, in such realistic scenarios, such a realistic environment, it ‘s great to train at such a location. I accept this duty. But first you have to let me see that location first. I would like to take a look to get a feel for it. Brother Thuan, then, contacted the French side. On the French side, there was an old colonel working side by side with the Governor. He had served with the French Army in Africa and was a member of Dessert Force. Later we met. He was a great man and we chatted about Pacification efforts, but I quickly set that topic aside to focus on the training duty. I asked myself: How would I organize? Who would be my staff members? I told Thuan. I accepted my duty, but I have no staff. How shall I go about this? He said, it ‘s all up to you. You could pick your own staff. Whomever you pick, we will approve unconditionally, right away. So I picked a few who attended Yen Bai school with me before. Dang Van De (Dang Van Sung ‘s brother) was one, a few more who were in my team there, and a couple more from VNQDD. I also picked Trung, a lieutenant in the National Guard Youth Union, and later served in the Regional Force. As for corporal, I picked one from our party, who had attended a corporal training class in Hai Phong. That man also recruited another master sergeant and two sergeants for the school’s staff. Then I wrote a plan, a training program, and listed out the equipment required for training. I said, to accept my duty, I must have a radio so that I can get to the governor directly. Thuan said: I will see to that (he probably had to really talk with the French to get that radio). They set up an office for me at the school. I said, there ‘s no need for any banner, or sign. On paper, that location is formally only a training center.
LMH: And how long did it take to complete your training program?
NT: The training started about a month after Tet (the New Year’s Celebration). I went to the French camp. That camp was large-scale with a minefield, and reinforced concrete structure, well-built and spacious. When I went there, the trainees weren’t there yet. The sector chief of Dap Cau was a middle-aged lieutenant colonel. I asked him: Colonel, we have a minefield here. May I have the map of that minefield, and also please let me know how you would support the school? He said: Once the school has been established, we can discuss how we would contact, how the school would be supported, and how to call artillery if necessary. Please take a look at the school first, then we can meet after. Things happened fast. The French provided the map of all the minefields around the school. As for communication, The Governor’s office informed me that the radio was ready and all the information on how to contact was also ready. The school sent a person to the Governor’s office to get the radio. In the meantime, I spent two, three days writing out the training program. My program was given to Thuan, who submitted it to the Governor’s office. Often, all was approved as written. With the training program done, I brought up another issue: My rank. I said: If I go to the training center as a civilian, it would be very difficult for me to talk to The French officer there. I told Thuan: I need to have an official rank. I am not asking it for the sake of having a title. This is a necessary thing. At least, my rank needs to be equivalent to that of a major. Because the number of trainees exceeds a battalion. Based on that number, I need to be Chef de bataillon (Battalion Chief). So I need at least 4 stripes. You can directly tell the Governor that. Without that, I simply can not do it. The request for the official rank is not for me. When the French soldiers look at me, they have to know the scope of my authority. I simply need to wear that military rank insignia. That would be enough. If they want to investigate, it ‘s up to them, but the insignia will give me authority. The Governor bestowed this authority on me to perform my duty. Any rank below major will not do. Seeing me so adamant about this, he said: Alright. Please let me talk to the Governor. It took them three days to get me the 4 stripes. Perhaps he discussed with his administrative aides on how to proceed and then he issued the credential document officially promoting me as a Civil Guard (Bao An Doan) Major. Then, the Civil Guard was under colonel Thu, a former French soldier (Thu is dead now). The credential document just stated Major without mentioning Civil Guard or anything. When the French colonel knew about my insignia, he smiled and said: That ‘s the proper way to go. Later, Thuan told me that the French were a bit angry when he told them that I had been trained by the Japanese. But Thuan explained that the Governor ‘s office had picked me because I had actually fought in Lao Cai and was wounded. I was picked because I was a true warrior, not someone who had never seen battles. That satisfied the French. When the documents were all ready, the Governor signed them all. I formally accepted my duty. But before I assumed my duty, the Governor said he would like to meet all of the Pacification cadres, Dai Viet’s members exclusively. At that time, the total number of Dai Viets was about 200. Then, Hoi was Commissioner Thuan ‘s chief of staff and had the rank of lieutenant. Others had no rank at all. Ung was also just a civil cadre. Thuan said: The Governor would like to meet all of you tomorrow’s evening. I asked: What ‘s the issues that he wishes to discuss? Thuan responded: Mr. Governor will let you know. I do not have the authority to speak for him. They probably have discussed it already, but did not want to reveal it to us. We met the next day at noon, in the Governor ‘s office. All the Dai Viet’s members discussed and proposed that we should have a representative to talk to the Governor. Being a newcomer from the South, I just sat and listened, saying nothing. Our comrades discussed among themselves. Sometimes Ung spoke, and then Hoi, and then Phan. Finally, they pointed at me and said: Let ‘s pick this guy to be our representative. I smiled and said. No, I won’t accept. I don’t know anything. You guys were here, quite sometimes, working on the Pacification Project, almost a year already. You guys know the issues and would be in a better position to talk. I just came. What do I know? Why would you pick me to be your representative? They all were quiet. I said: You guys were here working with the Governor. Now he wants to meet with you. Why do you push me out to talk? Then Hoi said: We pick you because you have the guts to speak up. OK. I agree that I have the guts. But what issue should I discuss? And what if he poses a question that I can not answer? Yes. I have the guts to speak up, but about what? They all were quiet again. And then one of them said: Let ‘s go to the meeting first, and then we can further discuss things there. I said: No, I don’t like the way you guys let things go like this. I am not going to the meeting. You guys go ahead. They all were quiet. Later, I knew that all of my comrades returned to their desks, chatting. Hoi came to talk to Commissioner Thuan, and probably told him that I had turned down their proposal. So Thuan suggested to him what to tell me. Hence, Hoi came to see me alone and said we should talk about the party’s issues. I said: If it ‘s the party’s issues then we all should go. All of us, not just you and me.
LMH: Please excuse me for my interruption, but I want to ask whether Commissioner Thuan was a Dai Viet’s member also?
NT: Yes. He was a Dai Viet. He was previously the County Chief (Tri Phu) of Quang Yen, also a mandarin in Tri ‘s group. The Governor had faith in him and hence made him his number 2 man in the Pacification project.
LMH: And when did Thuan join Dai Viet?
NT: That, I don’t know. I asked that very same question when I first got to Hanoi. My comrades knew he joined Dai Viet, but none of them knew when. He did talk about the Dai Viet ‘s strategy, so he was a Dai Viet. Secondly, he was a mandarin. Hence, definitely not a communist.
LMH: People still talk about Dai Viet Quan Lai (Mandarin Dai Viet). I want to know more about those mandarins, the County Chief, the province mandarin, … When did they join? During the time the French were still in control or after?
NT: They joined when the French were still in control, from the 40’s to 45. I am really not so sure, but take Tran Trung Dung for example. He was also a Dai Viet, a true Dai Viet. I met him a few times. He joined Dai Viet when he was with the French. But I am not sure about Commissioner Thuan.
LMH: Now I would like to ask you whether you knew about GAMO (Groupement administratif mobile opérationnel-Quân thứ lưu động)?
NT: Yes, I do.
LMH: What ‘s the relationship between the French ‘s GAMO with Governor Tri’s Pacification program?
NT: They are related since Governor Tri has a GAMO called Quan Thu Luu Dong. This GAMO was put under Do Dinh Dao, a member of Viet Quoc party. There was no friction between GAMO and the Pacification program. For example, if a district has been pacified then GAMO, with all the administrative personnels, would come to work. Pacification cadres have completely different duties. They will not interfere with GAMO ‘s works, only observe GAMO doing their work. The cadres will not fight, but play a supervisory role. So there was no friction. Do Dinh Dao was friendly with us. We had absolutely no friction. A lot of GAMO soldiers got killed. GAMO would fight together with the French Army. The Vietnamese units came much later, when the French mobilized the Vietnamese. The French, then, also had Vietnamese units, but the main ones were French’s. Once arriving at a pacified district, GAMO would install the administrative system right away. Pacification cadres would not interfere with GAMO ‘s effort. Pacification cadres would come to observe how the administrative effort dovetailed with the military Pacification efforts. This military Pacification effort was different from our Pacification. We just came to observe to see whether the GAMO’s efforts were effective and how effective was that effort? Our Pacification could only observe. That was it.
LMH: Let ‘s return to your training center. How long did that training center remain in operation?
NT: The training period was 4 months. When we were training, the gentleman from the French’s sous-secteur supported us. And then there ‘s an American group, headed by an American colonel, came to visit. The colonel came with a group of lieutenant colonels, and lieutenants, about 10 in total. I did not know why they wanted to visit the school. They spent the whole day at the school. I served as their guide and showed them around. The colonel asked: how do you organize your defense force here? I presented my plan, my maps and showed them our training place. They came to my office, the eating room, the place where we had our fighting exercises. We came to a place where there were about 30 young men sitting. What for? They asked. I explained: It ‘s not only today, when you visit that these young men are here. They are here everyday. We always have 20 men here. They are our guards. We rotate our guards so the guards can also train. If we have to fight, the guard units know what they are supposed to do. Here, our goal is to make our soldiers versatile. Their versatility would enable them to take on different duties in their hamlets. They are trained essentially to protect their hamlets. There ‘s no need to train them as soldiers of conventional forces. These units are hamlet defending units. The American visitors were very interested in my briefing. There was also a meeting which included the French officer. I forgot the French colonel’s name. In the evening, when the American group left, the colonel met with me privately. He said, when you return to Hanoi, I would like to meet you for a private talk. He gave me his address. Seeing me talking with the American colonel, Thuan was suspicious. When the American group left, Thuan said: The French colonel asked about your talk with the American colonel. I smiled and said: Don’t worry. There was nothing between me and that gentleman. He only said that please contact him when I return to Hanoi. From then on the training went on until the 4th month. The 4th month was July.
LMH: July 1954?
NT: July 1954. The fighting situation (between the French and the Communist) was tense then. I pushed our trainees practice fighting outside a few times to get a feel around, but all was quiet. It was also quiet on the other side of the river. My news about the outside world came from a very young French lieutenant. The young French lieutenant was impressed with the way I ran the school. When running the school, I ordered the cadets not to let any stranger in, even if he was French. If a French officer came to visit, I would have been informed. If there was no word from me, then no one could come in. Once, there was a French Major, driving his jeep to the school. The young Vietnamese Guards could not speak French, but De and a few others who could were there. The French colonel was told that the Battalion Chief was not inside and he was not allowed in. Later, I knew that the French Major came, wanting to discuss with me about the current military situation. He was furious when the guard refused to let him in. The next day when I returned, he came, angrily complained about the incident. I smiled and said: You are a military man, so am I. We both know what discipline is. Here is an outpost. Would it be necessary for me to remind you that in the Hong river’s delta, there had been incidents in which French agents, working for the other side, came inside the outpost with the enemy to ambush? I took those lessons to heart to teach my cadets. Please understand that my cadets had nothing against you personally. I thought that you would take the occasion to praise them for their discipline. In addition, I myself told them not to let their guard down when they see the Europeans. I had also told your Colonel to please inform us a day in advance if someone plans to visit. And if I did not pick up the phone, then please do not come. If I don’t stress the discipline, this outpost may fall and the defense line would be broken, starting from this place. What shall we do then? The French officer calmed down. From then on, there weren’t any complaints. The fighting went on ferociously in July, but from my outpost, I knew nothing about the political developments outside. I only knew that the fighting was fierce and there were political negotiations going on at Geneva. Most of my time was spent with training cadets. I had no time to think. Also, there was no one coming down from Hanoi to bring any news. One day, there was a young French captain coming to visit. I was at the school and allowed him in. Looking back, I saw that the young man was clever and discreet. He asked: Sir, how ‘s the situation here? Is it stable? I said: As far as I can see, the situation here is pretty stable. I had the cadets out patrolling more than 2 kilometers away and we did not see anything. One day, there was a French group, carrying out a raid somewhere, on their way back. A few of them were wounded and a few others dead. They asked permission to use the school’s road as their shortcut to return. I ordered the gate open so that the French tanks and soldiers could use our roads. I asked the French: How many of you were dead. They said: about 5. I told my sergeant: Please have 5 men with rifles come in. There were dead French soldiers. I want to salute them. The French were touched. They had lost and came back with their wounded men and their dead. I and the other 5 cadets stood to salute them. I was not trying to gain favors. My thought was: these men had died for us, we should at least do something to show our respects. This happened at the end of June. In July, the young French captain came with a GMC truck loaded with bullets, rifles and even machine guns. I laughed and said: What a generous gift! I invited him into my office for a few beers. I said: Your gift was tremendous. It would last us 6 months! He replied: Maybe not that long. Who knows it might just last you three months. We chatted and then I asked him: Hey Captain, how ‘s the military situation now? He said: very critical. Later, I learned that the Captain was an intelligent officer (deuxième bureau). I continued with my question: How ‘s the political development at Geneva? I am out here in this outpost, completely ignorant. He asked: Your superior didn’t tell you anything? I said: I spent all my time training my cadets, and had no time for political activities. Political activities are their jobs. He said: Geneva might lead to some kind of arrangements. I really don’t know much, but if you can keep this place stable, all of us would be really happy. So I knew, then, that except at this outpost, other places were very unstable. Secondly, the enemy had not tested our cadets yet. They just shot their rifles from the other side. In the meantime, whenever there were boats traversing the river either up or down then two of our machine guns on the terrace of the reinforced concrete building would open fire to stop them. Then, I would telephone the district head telling him to search. That ‘s his duty. We only support him. The province head was only too happy to conduct his search. So the situation was stable. I was able to block that part of the river, helping out the district head, and at the same time serving as an outpost for the sector headquarters. When we went out patrolling, practicing fighting, we would go as far out as 2, 3 kilometers and things were relatively quiet. Hence, All of a sudden before 20th of April.
LMH: You mean 20th of July?
NT: I forgot, yes July. I told myself that I have to find a way to keep the school’s force intact, not letting it be exposed to any harm. I only had one more week, then the training session would be finished. If I waited until the enemy arrived, there would definitely be friction. Hence, I radioed the Governor’s office and was told to get back to his office immediately. That afternoon, I went there in a Jeep. That evening, I briefed the Governor and a few others, including Hoi. I said: We are all fine, but I got the news from the intelligence sector that these things will happen. Under the previous order of the Governor, we are to defend the school. But that order only applies during the training time, when the school is under attacks. Now, we are about done with our training. By April, the training will have been completed. The only thing left now is the graduation ceremony. We are now one week from graduation. If we have to fight now, our fighting is not for protecting the school. If we were to fight, I would have to answer the cadets’ question: What are we fighting for? What is it that we are trying to protect? We came here to train so that we know how to protect our hamlets, our families, as you had said. We are not a fighting force. We are ready to fight if we are attacked during the training time. Their attacks would have been best for our training. Also, during our training time, we did patrol within the perimeter of 2, 3 kilometers around the school, and found all was quiet, as written in our weekly and monthly reports. Now, because of the political developments, the communists will soon arrive and since we are done with our training, there is no point in our fighting to keep the school. I said: I am basically done with training cadets. The only thing left now is graduation. With the current political development, I request to have all the cadets brought back to Hanoi, and then sent home immediately to protect their hamlets. The Governor said: Well, such a drastic move! The Governor said he was very hesitant about my request. I said directly (to the Governor): Brother Tri, please let me do it. You can not do it, so please let me do it. The Governor queried: How do you do it? I said: Just leave it to me. He said: Alright. I asked once more for his confirmation: Would you really let me do it? He said: Alright, let me talk to the French colonel. I said: Please do not talk. You and brother Thuan should not talk to the French colonel at all. Please let me stay here tonight. I will talk to the colonel tomorrow. He agreed. The colonel often came around 11am. I was very happy seeing him. After greeting him, I said: I came here to ask when to have the Graduation Ceremony. He said: Good, what ‘s your plan? I said: The training was basically done. I planned to have my cadets returned home to protect their hamlets. Informed of the political developments at Geneva, the colonel agreed to my suggestion. He asked: Alright, what do you need now? I said: 20 GMC trucks to bring my cadets and my weapons back to Hanoi. He asked: Fine, when would you like to have them? I said: 14th of July. On the 14th so that we can see the French ‘s marching ceremony. In fact, the French’s marching ceremony had already stopped. The colonel smiled and said things would be ready on the 14th. On the morning of the 14th, 20 GMC trucks arrived at our school. I came out. Both French officers, the Major, whom the guards did not let in before, and the captain ran over and asked me: What ‘s going on? They both were bewildered. I said: This is the Governor’s order to have the cadets returned. They asked: So, this school is abandoned? I said: Yes, I am turning the school over to you. This is the Governor’s order. He had also sent the GMC trucks. There was nothing I could do. I had to send all the cadets back. They asked: But where to? I said: I only knew they had to come back to protect their hamlets. The two French officers, just standing there, were completely confused. And then the province head came. He and the district head had never deigned to pay the school any visit, but now they came to beg me to transport all the province’s weapons and ammunitions to Hanoi as well. I told the province head’s representative, perhaps his deputy: Please tell the province head to get all the weapons and ammunition to one place. I will have an empty truck there. Please load all of that in the truck, and wait till our convoy arrives. When our convoy passes through, have your weapon truck cut into the middle and go with us. All the GMC trucks were driven by French drivers. The French sergeant told me: All trucks were ready for you. I told a French sergeant: Sergeant, please have one truck come to pick up ammunition. Please have that truck wait there till our convoy passes through and have the driver cut into the middle. Please tell them that ‘s my order. The sergeant sent out the truck as requested. We, at the school, started loading our belongings onto those remaining trucks. The cadets did not have anything other than their backpacks. I told them to forget all the furniture. We only worried about documents in the office. We then drove out. I was ahead of the convoy. When we approached Long Bien (Doumier) bridge I informed the Guard that we have a convoy of 20 GMC trucks coming up in 10 minutes. You have to let the whole convoy pass through without cutting it apart. The guard agreed. When we reached Hanoi, I had to make a requisition and used Yen Phu school as a place to unload the ammunition truck. I came in to see the principal and said: Sir, I was a student here before, and now I need to use the school. The principal was happy to let the truck in. The weapon and ammunition filled the whole classroom. I assigned two cadets there to guard, then assembled all cadets at Yen Phu school. I also informed Commissioner Thuan and the Governor that I need the seal to stamp cadets’ certificates. I also said I need to pay all cadets. I told Thuan, if you can’t come up with the money within two days, I will have all the cadets assemble at the Governor’s office. It ‘s just unthinkable that they don’t get any payments after months of training! I got my money and everything was resolved. I contacted the French, telling them to pick up the weapons and ammunition. After everything was done, I came to the Governor’s office to report that my duties had been completed, and I wished to be formally relieved of the training duty. That was the last time I saw the Governor. He then went to the South and was assassinated there.
LMH: And what was the month he was assassinated?
NT: I did not know since I was still in Hanoi. I left Hanoi for Hai Phong one day before the communists arrived. I stayed at Hai Phong until May, and left for Saigon also just one day before the communists arrived there. So I only learned about the Governor’s assasination later. He died at Majestic Hotel.
Nguyễn Đình Tú 5–VP-LMH-A071
LMH: Now, Please let me ask you, uncle, about your personal information. Where were you born and what ‘s your date of birth?
NT: I was born in Hanoi, December 26th 1924. That means I am 79 now.
LMH: May I know more about your father and how many brothers and sisters you have?
NT: My father was a civil engineer, designing bridges, dikes. He was a well-accomplished civil engineer. During the French time, working as a civil engineer, he reached the top rank in his field. When I was curious, he had also taught me a bit about topography. This turned out to be an advantage for me later when I was trained in the military school. I was in a better position than my classmates because of my knowledge about topography. I had more experiences than others in topographical training. I could never anticipate that the experience of my father had helped me when we were trained by the Japanese officers. My mother was a typical woman of her time. Her focus was exclusively on her family. She was also a competent lady. Hence, our living standard was a bit above average. We had a sizable mansion on Antoine Bonnet street, later Chau Long street. That mansion spreaded out to Do Huu Vi street. It was quite large and there was land around. The land from that mansion leading up to the water treatment plant was my family’s property. All those on that street were only one-storied houses and my parents rented those out. When the tenants there could not pay rents, my parents forgave most of their debts. We had to assume the loss and it hurt us financially. But both of my parents said: When people have their misfortunes, we should not push them too hard. That ‘s the lesson I learned from my parents. Children are often proud of their parents. I don’t want to overpraise my parents, but I am proud of them. From them I have learned that one should not let one’s greed eclipse all moral values.
LMH: And how many brothers and sisters do you have?
NT: This is just between you and me.
LMH: Yes.
NT: Up until now, nobody knew about my brothers and sisters, including Sung. But he never asked me about my family. I especially respected him for that. As for me, personally I had also never asked Sung about his family. Most of it he told me when we chatted in our private talks. He revealed a bit here and there when he was a little drunk, about his family, his relationship with Quat. I just listened, but never delved into the details.
LMH: Yes, uncle. You can just mention how many brothers and sisters. There ‘s no need to elaborate.
NT: Our family has four kids. I loved my oldest brother the most. My family and our clan had all lived in Thang Long for many centuries. We had stayed there seemingly forever. . .
LMH: And what ‘s your rank among your siblings?
NT: I am the 2nd. My older brother also went to Lycée. He died when he was very young. . .
LMH: You don’t have to elaborate. . .
NT: Alright.
LMH: Then you have two younger brothers?
NT: Yes. Two younger ones. The third one also died already. When I left, I abandoned my two younger brothers. I abandoned them for 2 reasons. First, because I joined the Dai Viet party. This I can tell you directly since there ‘s no need to hide anything. When I left, I believed that with my family’s fortune my two brothers could get along well. My two brothers were young, but they could manage. The third one was about 11 years old, the fourth one 4 or 5. Later, when we went our separate ways, I met the youngest one once in Hai Phong, but we lost touch now. The third one, I never met. Later, when I went to Saigon, he also went. I was able to contact him. Then, he was still alive, already married, and had a son. He was a doctor and lived in Hanoi. I had to protect him. So when captured, I said I was the only child in my family. Until now, when all of my acquaintances asked, I just said. Well, the war separated our family. I am very sad about my family. That ‘s all.
LMH: Thank you, uncle. Let ‘s turn to another issue now. You said you came to Saigon in 1948 and you had other activities there. What did you do during 1949 (after you taught at the Nha Trang Training Center) in the south?
NT: In 1949. Brother Nguyen Ton Hoan sent his man to search for me. Hoan was the Youth Minister then. He sent his man to invite me to meet with him. When we met, he said: Now that I am the Youth Minister, please come to help me with the Youth Training Center at Nha Trang. I accepted and became the Deputy Director of that school. Among my trainees was Duong Hieu Nghia, Tran Van Hai, Ma Sanh Nhon, Dinh Thanh On. All were successful. There were others who were also successful that came to meet me. They all were officers of senior rank. Tran Van Hai became a General, and there were a couple more, who also became Generals. I forgot their names. Ma Sanh Nhon you probably knew. Duong Hieu Nghia you also already knew. Later, he was a Major at Morbihan (Ecole Militaire Interarmes–in Bretagne). He was Vinh Long’s province head and then the commander of an armor unit. When teaching those trainees at Nha Trang, I stressed disciplines. In that military program (Nguyen Ngoc Huy was responsible for political subjects) I considered my emphasizing discipline a success. Later, when all of my trainees went into the Army, they all were successful partly thanks to the discipline guidelines that I had emphasized.
LMH: And you stayed at Nha Trang until which year?
NT: Till 1949. After the training class, called the Quyet Tien class, Nguyen Ton Hoan was no longer the Youth Minister. Vu Hong Khanh replaced him. I returned to Saigon then. I stayed at Nha Trang for three months to turn over my responsibilities, then went to Saigon. At Saigon, I went to teach at Kien Thiet School where Kieu also was teaching. Kieu is Thieu ‘s older brother. We knew one another before and were very close friends. We both taught there till 1953 when I returned to Hanoi. During this time, besides teaching, I also met with other Southern Dai Viet comrades such as Nguyen Ngoc Huy and Thanh Nien Bao Quoc Doan (National Youth Guard Union), Nguyen Huu Nang (later assassinated), Gia Hiep and other Dai Viet leader with the exception of Muoi Huong (Muoi Huong was not respected at all). The southern comrades formed their own group, but they were very respectful with me. Whatever they asked of me, I never declined, such as the training at An Thanh island (that I had told you earlier). So they had no complaints whatsoever about me. On the contrary, they even considered me a friend. Later, when Nguyen Ngoc Huy with the Bao Quoc Doan (National Youth Guard Union) came to campaign in Hanoi, I did not go with them. I stayed in Saigon and continued teaching.
LMH: At that time, did Kieu work with Nguyen Ngoc Huy?
NT: They only kept in touch. But later, they did work with one another. When Nguyen Ton Hoan became deputy Prime Minister responsible for Pacification under Nguyen Khanh’s administration, Nguyen Ngoc Huy was famous and so was Kieu. At that time, when invited to work with the government, Kieu had no staff. He came to see me and said: Please be the Youth General Director. Then the Youth Union under Cao Xuan Vy had disintegrated. I had thought about Kieu’s invitation for three days before I accepted. I asked Kieu: When asking me to be the Youth General Director, what are your plans or programs? Well, he believed me so much that what he said was astounding: No, I have no plan at all. Please let me know what you plan to do. I would approve it right away. I said immediately: We have Ngo Dinh Nhu’s Thanh Nien Chien Dau (Fighting Youth Union). I know they have 15,000 young men with M1 rifles which the American had furnished when they supported Diem. This is a force with the man power of more than a division. We have to keep that force.
LMH: This is during Prime Minister Quat or General Khanh?
NT: Under General Khanh. When General Khanh invited Dr. Quat then I worked directly with him (I had my personal relationship with Quat, but my relationship with him then wasn’t involved with government’s works)
LMH: That means you were Youth General Director before Quat’s administration.
NT: Before Quat, I was the General Director, which meant immediately after General Khanh’s coup, Kieu was invited to be Youth Minister. Indeed, Kieu declined the offer to be Youth Minister. He said: Please let me be Special Commissioner for Youth. He was a decent man, just focused on how to make things run smoothly. He wasn’t out looking for position or status. He was looking for staff to help him, but could not find anybody so he came to me and said: I can not find anyone to help me. Please come to help me. He invited me partly because I knew Hieu, his older brother. At that time, Kieu lived on Dixmude street. I forgot the later Vietnamese name for that street. When Hieu came from Phan Rang to visit, Kieu invited me over to talk to him. We had a very long chat. That night, Thieu suddenly came to visit. (He was lieutenant colonel then) That was the first time I saw him. I was very impressed with the way Kieu and his younger brother paid respect toward their older brother. In a traditional family, the oldest would always look out for the younger ones, and the younger ones, in turn, would always be respectful toward the oldest. That night, we sat at a circular table. Mr. Hieu sat here, I sat in the middle and Kieu was on the other side. Thieu came but dared not sit down. He stood behind, and then was introduced to me. That ‘s how I knew Thieu.
LMH: Is Thieu a Dai Viet’s member?
NT: At that time, I did not know, but I knew Kieu was a Dai Viet’s member. But I think that Thieu must have already joined Dai Viet, since in a Vietnamese family the younger ones often follow the older ones, especially in a traditional family like his family. Personally, I had never seen Kieu talk to Thieu about anything. Later, I knew that Thieu was a Dai Viet’s member and. . . That ‘s all.
LMH: And how long did you serve as Youth General Director?
NT: Just over a year, until 1965. Then there was friction with the Army. Didn’t I tell you this already?
LMH: Yes. You did, but it was not recorded on tape yet.
NT: Let me tell it again then. At that time, Kieu approved of my authority to make decisions. The authority to make decisions ranging from the General Office down to local offices was in my hand. Kieu automatically entrusted me with all authority. He said: Please do whatever you wish to do. Just inform me a bit. Whatever decision you make, please inform me. I promise I will approve. I said cautiously: Our close friendship is one thing. It is quite another thing when it comes to comradeship. Please do not mistake one for the other. Now that I make decisions, at the top, you have to accept all the responsibilities. If you see that my decisions have gone too far, you have to caution me. If you see something that I should not do, please let me know also so that we both can discuss. So in the first few months, Kieu would set out the time to talk with me privately. I briefed him on everything, all difficulties I faced. During that time, I did not know why the American thought that Cao Xuan Vy was still the Youth General Director. All of the documents sent to the office still had his name and his title as General Director. So when the documents came to my desk, I told Kieu that we must be fair: We have to inform the American that Cao Xuan Vy was no longer the General Director, and currently, I am the active General Director. Do you agree? Kieu told me to go ahead. I sent three letters within three months informing the American that after the coup, Cao Xuan Vy was no longer the General Director. I was the General Director for the new Administration under General Khanh. My current boss was the new commissioner, Nguyen Van Kieu. Kieu reviewed my draft and approved it before I sent it out. About a month later, there was a telephone call from the American side, I did not know whether from the embassy or other office requesting a meeting with me. The officer who requested the meeting was a one-star General whose name I forgot. Prior to meeting him, I informed Kieu, telling him that when I agreed to their request, it was done on his behalf and now he should be the one to meet with the General. Mr. Kieu said: Between us, there is no difference. Either you or me, it ‘s the same. Please meet with him and brief me afterward. I said, No. Mr. Kieu explained: Brother Tu, it ‘s good for us both this way. If there is something that you must decline, it ‘s much better for you to let me say “No”. This way, you still can keep your relationship with the American side. Kieu was ahead of me in his thinking and I agreed. I no longer insisted that the American General should meet with Kieu. From then on, they kept me as their contact. I intended to use my American contacts to get help with my trying to keep the Fighting Youth Union. Quat had not yet become a government official then. Thieu was the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff (Not the General Chief of Staff), only chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, still under the General Chief of Staff. I went to visit Thieu twice. We had friendly chats. Through his brothers, He already knew me. I told Thieu directly: We have the Fighting Youth Union issue. Please help brother Kieu to keep the Union. We shouldn’t be too rigid about our principles. Furthermore, the Fighting Youth Union is not Diem. It was set up by Diem, but he is dead now. The Union is now without a leader. If the communists take them, that would be a deadly move. We are talking about 15,000 man force. It ‘s not a joke at all. I think we should keep that force. I was very informal in my talk, just the military man’s talk. Thieu said: I agree with you on principles. Please discuss it with Kieu. Whatever you decide, I shall agree. I said, Kieu has told me that my decision is his. You can confirm that with him. Thieu smiled: Of course, I believe you. I said, please don’t just think so. Please do confirm with Kieu. I would also brief him about my meeting with you so that he is informed. So everything was going smoothly. Then suddenly Quat became Prime Minister. With Quat being the new minister, I resigned. Our government operated much like the French system. The General Director was appointed as the Prime Minister proposed, not the commissioner. If the Prime Minister made the proposal, it would be reviewed by the president right away. If I were to be dismissed, then the dismissal would have to come from the Prime Minister, not the Commissioner. Of course the commissioner could propose. If the commissioner proposed the dismissal, the Prime Minister would often just sign. At that time Kieu already resigned. Having learned about his resignation the day before, I told Kieu: Now that you have resigned, it ‘s also the time for me to resign. He smiled and said. Please do not think so. What are your thoughts? I said: When another man replaces you, it goes without saying that he can not agree with me on all issues that we did. It would be best for me to offer my resignation. Then Nguyen Cao Ky was in to replace Kieu. With Ky coming in, things were messed up.
LMH: So when Quat became Prime Minister, you were still the Youth General Director?
NT: Yes, but when Ky came in, Quat had not yet. . .
LMH: Didn’t Ky come in after Quat was no longer the Prime Minister?
NT: No. Ky was invited to be the Youth Minister.
LMH: Yes, Sir.
NT: Ky was in to replace Kieu. I was there, but I had turned in my resignation. During this time Nguyen Tan Hong was there. Nguyen Tan Hong knew Ky before. I myself knew Hong when he was still just a lieutenant. At that time he was already a colonel, but he was in the military medical corp. When I last visited Nguyen Tan Hong, I saw Nguyen Cao Ky. Then, Ky was still a lieutenant. We only shook hands. When Kieu resigned, Ky came in and I came to brief him. That was the time when Ky met with me directly. I was waiting to be dismissed, but Ky wanted me to stay. Later, I was told that Nguyen Tan Hong had talked to Ky about keeping me. In fact, I never asked Nguyen Tan Hong for Ky’s favor. Though Nguyen Tan Hong and I were close friends, I had never asked him to talk to Ky to have me stay in office. If I wanted to stay, I only needed to talk to Kieu. Kieu himself told me to stay. But Ky wanted me to stay on duty. I also told Kieu about Ky’s decision to have me stay on duty. Kieu said, if he wants you to stay on duty, maybe you should rethink your decision to resign? I said immediately: No. I simply can not work with Ky. When I came to brief him, his talks were really rambling. He was a cowboy general. It ‘s impossible to be a cowboy general in a government ‘s office. Though I don’t mind yielding to him if I think I can push things through, I don’t think I can. I just briefed him on everything, stayed on for a short time and then resigned. After a short time, Ky left as I had predicted. Nguyen Tan Hong came in to replace him. I knew Nguyen Tan Hong well. (Nguyen Tan Hong’s wife was the aunt of Tran Do Cung ‘s wife. And Cung’s wife was Nguyen Dinh Tai’s daughter. Tai was security director in the north during Governor Tri’s time). I knew them all and was close with them all. Nguyen Tan Hong was a very close friend of mine. He told me: You stay on with me, Pal. I said, No. Please look for another man. You just can’t deal with my work. I am thinking about the Fighting Youth Union. Nguyen Tan Hong was a kind man, but he ‘s not a warrior. I wanted to resign, but I did not want to be too harsh with Hong. I said. Alright, during the time you look for a new man to replace me, I still stay on duty as General Director and I request you as the Commissioner to grant me 50.000 dollars to help out the Fighting Youth Union’s branches in various provinces. Nguyen Tan Hong agreed right away. So I had money. I went on my way to Quang Ngai and had another administrative staff member, meaning a financial staff member come along with me. I visited a few dangerous districts. They enjoyed talking to me. I did not tell the Youth branches that I will resign. I just told them this is the money from the ministry supporting you with your activities. After distributing all the money, I went back to report and then I resigned. That year was 1965. So I had served more than a year, more than 12 months. Let me go into more detail (this relates to Ung) when Hong was already Youth Commissioner. Ung was suddenly invited. This was because Le Van Tien was campaigning for Ung behind the scenes. (Tien did not tell me, neither did Ung), but all of it leaked out later. Ung told me, I am invited to be the Pacification Chief. What do you think? I said, it ‘s up to you. I can’t think for you. You have to decide on your own. Ky was the Prime Minister at the time. Later, Hong told me that he told Ky about Ung. Ky respected Hong and responded positively when Hong suggested Ung. Ung’s acceptance was not exclusively because of Hong. I heard that Nhu Phong (Le Van Tien) had also got in touch with Ung a lot. Ung asked me: I am invited and I want to know what you think. I told Ung. If you ask me then my advice is: No. You should not accept the invitation. You can’t do it. Ky, let me be direct with you, can only be a gang leader, but not a leader of a government. Ung asked: How do you know? I said, You have to remember that, on his first day as Prime Minister, he had a press conference. I was there from the beginning till the end. I observed the ways he expressed himself, his gestures and his behaviors in public. That day, the auditorium was packed. There were a lot of Americans. Of course, there were a lot of Americans from the embassy, and the press. There were more Vietnameses than foreigners. That auditorium was in front of the Prime Minister’s office on Thong Nhat Street. That place was previously a French military camp.
LMH: Excuse me. That was when you had already quit working with the government, and was working as a journalist?
NT: Yes. I had already quit. I told Ung: It ‘s up to you to decide, but if you ask me, my advice is: No. You should not accept. There will be a lot of hassles. You would not be able to accomplish anything. With such an impetuous, cowboy Prime Minister, he might nod, and agree with everything you suggest, and then make his decisions far different from what you intend. Your dream will be shattered. Ung said nothing, but he accepted. Ung was working for Indochinois bank at the time. He was responsible for the import-export portfolio. The French had great respect for him and put him at important posts. When Ung resigned from the bank, he no longer had a home. He used to have a large apartment right on top of the bank, but that perk was taken away as he quit. When I was the Youth General Director, the government had a small villa set up for me. That villa was a small, pretty villa, right next to the tennis court of the ministry. It was very convenient if the General Director stayed there. I did not even move in yet. The villa was being renewed. With Ung having no place, I told him: Hey Ung, you can stay at my house. Just bring your wife and kids in. (Ung had six kids) I just tell people that my family is staying there. No one will dare to say anything. Secondly, Kieu also knew, but looked the other way.
LMH: By then both, you and Kieu, had already resigned. How could you have kept the house?
NT: No. I haven’t yet at that time. Also when Nguyen Tan Hong became the Commissioner, I told him right away: I quit. But I offer my villa to Ung and his family. Please don’t push him out. Nguyen Tan Hong agreed. Ung accepted my offer. A few months into his new assignment, when returning from Quang Ngai, after a mission, his helicopter crashed. He and two other staff members died. The Youth Ministry was like a snake without the head. I told Nguyen Tan Hong: Ung is the Pacification Chief. Though he has died, his death does not mean that his wife and kids should be pushed out on the street. Ung’s wife and kids should be left alone in my villa until I can find a new place for them. I did not have to worry. Nguyen Tan Hong was a decent man. Later, I found another house, a duplex, Ung ‘s wife and kids moved there. In the meantime, the government also moved to help Ung’s wife. Nguyen Cao Ky gave Ung’s family a house in the area in front of the Vinh Nghiem pagoda. The new house that was assigned for Ung’s family already had a tenant, an employee of Dinh Trinh Chinh, information minister at that time. That employee refused to move, so temporarily Ung’s family was without a home. I pressed Nguyen Tan Hong to get them a duplex for them. Ung’s family went there and waited till the tenant moved out. When he did, Ung’s family moved in and stayed there till 1975.
LMH: You met Quat in 1947. Did you ever contact him for anything else?
NT: After that, Quat sometimes came to visit Sung. When Mr. Sung was not there, Quat stayed there and chatted with me. Just short conversations about politics and nothing special. At that time, he had not set his mind to pursue a career in politics yet.
LMH: I thought he had worked for the government since Tran Van Huu’s administration, meaning he had entered politics already in 1949?
NT: Let me see. I was in Nha Trang 1949. I am not sure. Tran Van Tuyen did.
LMH: No. Quat was Education Minister during Tran Van Huu’s administration.
NT: Yes. That ‘s right. Education Minister. That ‘s right. I remember now. Tran Van Tuyen was chief of staff at the Prime Minister’s office. But I did not keep in touch with him then.
LMH: And he was in Saigon then?
NT: Yes. He was in Saigon. But I was in Nha Trang in 1949.
LMH: He started working for the government since Tran Van Huu’s administration and then finally?
NT: Later, I wrote an article about his death. I wrote that he was Education Minister. . . so that was right.
LMH: He worked at Van Khoa University for Hanoi University. So when did you get in touch with him?
NT: When I was Youth General Director. I was in touch with him then for political activities, but socially, I sometimes came to visit, or dine at his house where we both chatted about current political affairs, just social conversations, nothing special.
LMH: When you were Youth General Director, during Nguyen Khanh’s time, what was Quat doing?
NT: Let me see. Quat did nothing then. When Nguyen Khanh first got power, he still had his medical lab.
LMH: His medical lab on Hai Ba Trung Street?
NT: No. Not on Hai Ba Trung street yet. That lab was on Phan Thanh Gian street. It was a small house. I went there a few times for a medical check up. It was much later that he had a lab house built at Hai Ba Trung street. His first medical lab was clean, but small, in a small house.
LMH: When Quat became the Prime Minister, did he invite you for any position?
NT: When he became Prime Minister, I was still Youth General Director. He did not ask me to join him or anything. We just met and talked. He became Prime Minister on 2/17. I was still Youth General Director. I remember, I was working long hours in my office. I was in the office during noon time and also in the evening. At that time, I had meetings during the day and had to review documents at night.
LMH: Did Kieu resign at that time yet?
NT: Kieu did resign already. Ah, No. Not yet. He planned to resign, but still remained in office, waiting for the new official to come in to replace him. Kieu would leave in a couple of days. At that time, each day he only came in for about 1,2 hours then left. He did not stay because he did not want to take on new responsibilities. He had already turned in his resignation letter. One day, I was in my office, my telephone rang. Diem was on the other end: Do you have time? I said, Go ahead. Diem said: I am here with Sung. I would like to invite you to dinner with me and Sung. I asked: What ‘s up? Diem said: We will talk when we meet. I will be there in half an hour. I called my clerk, instructed him on how to go on with all the documents I was working with and left. I went to Diem’s house in Charner. Sung was there. Diem’s family had finished their lunch. Sung sat there and there was a food tray ready for us. We sat down to dine together. I asked: What is it that you would like to talk to me about? Diem said: On his assuming premiership, Quat told us (meaning Sung and Diem) to prepare a speech for him. So Sung and I invite you here so that we can discuss this thing. I said: So, why don’t you two just go ahead? The discussion between you two should be enough. Why include me? What do I know about government and politics? When we had finished our lunch, we went to the sofa to continue our talk. Diem again urged: Please write the draft for the speech. Please write it for us. I said: Sung can write and present his ideas as such and such. If Quat had asked you both to write then surely, he must have told you about the government’s policies which he wished to express. I had no idea what the Hell to write. His response was something I would never forget: “Well, please “be thoughtful and creative” with your draft and then once your draft is done, we will add our ideas to that”. I said: Oh, so right now, you two gentlemen, please brief me about yours and Quat’s ideas. I myself did not meet with Quat and now you invite me here for this. I don’t know whether Quat knew about you inviting me here to do this for you. Why did you not ask Quat for his own thoughts about the policies of his government? Diem said, Actually, Quat said: just “be thoughtful and creative”. I wasn’t sure whether Quat had said “be thoughtful and creative” or anything. So I said: Quat is a very careful man. There was no way that he could have said “be thoughtful and creative”. Your words are hard to believe. Well, you have to write it. I don’t know a darned thing about the government. I am only a General Director about to retire, who had already turned in his resignation, waiting to be relieved. If you ask me to write about issues within my ministry, then perhaps I can write something. But here, you are asking me, one who does not know anything about military or politics, to write about the new policies for a new Prime Minister? Both of them were quiet. Then Diem said again: Just be “thoughtful and creative”, otherwise . . . Both of them stood up patting my back. Sung said: “Please try your best!” I smiled: “Oh God! Try? You gentlemen tell me to try? A man knowing nothing like me can try? Really? Both of them then walk away. Sung left. Diem retired to his room with his wife. A short while later, Diem came back with a stack of papers and a pen and said: Please sit here and try to write the draft. So I said there, wracking my brain to work on the draft: first point, second point, third point, fourth point, but my most emphasized point is: The Fighting Youth Union, about politics, and then a few lines about military as if about life. I worked hard on the draft, rewrote that draft to make it more legible, then called Diem. I said, here ‘s my final draft. The next day Chinh Luan had my draft right on the first page, stating: Prime Minister Quat’s article. I read, my article had been published verbatim, not cutting out any word. In that article there was my emphasized point about the Fighting Youth Union. That ‘s the only thing I cared about, and that was it. After the article was published, Sung was never in touch with me. Bui Diem was never in touch either, never mentioned to me that my article was given to Chinh Luan. Quat, himself, never knew I wrote that article. He only knew much later when we both were in prison. He had always thought that Diem was the one who authored that article. Let me tell you more about how Quat knew. In 1978, my cell at first was on the first floor. Later, they moved me to another cell upstairs. It was during Tet 1978. The discipline was loose on Tet. Normally, there were many prisoners in that cell : Quat, Ngo Khac Tinh, Ho Van Cham. Ngo Khac Tinh and his brother were both ministers. Besides there were the deputy Korean Ambassador and two attaché who worked at the Korean Embassy, one labor attaché, one cultural attaché. All were high ranking officials, lieutenant colonels and colonels. I was the only civil person with another one-legged dissident. There was one Airborne Sergeant who was the Cell Head. The rest were all lieutenant colonels and colonels. It was during Tet, so the discipline was more relaxed than usual. I was walking with Quat and a few other prisoners. They all were probably civil government workers before. I did not ask and we just kept on walking until all of them had left. Finally, when I was alone with Quat, we both started talking about things in the past, about the time when he first became Prime Minister. I told him then that I was the one who wrote the article he had used. I mentioned the Fighting Youth Union. It was only then that Quat knew I wrote that article. He was completely surprised: Wow, I never knew you wrote that. Brother Diem gave it to me saying he was the author. I told him: I only tell the story so that you know. I am not telling this to get credit or anything. A prisoner as I am now, there is absolutely no point in trying to get any personal credit. Let me reveal this to you: the Fighting Youth Union plan was my own work. Only a few others knew about my plan: Commissioner Kieu in the Youth Ministry, General Khanh, Thieu, since he was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I knew because I proposed the original idea. How could Diem have known about the plan to author it? I mention the Fighting Youth Union issue written in the article so you can see that I authored that.
LMH: Then after that when did Quat get in touch with you more?
NT: From then on, .. .
LMH: If Quat never knew that you wrote his policy article, how did he know to get in touch with you?
NT: I was still the Youth General Director. When I finished that article, I was still the Director. I was, according to governmental hierarchy, a subordinate, working under the Prime Minister. Though I had submitted my resignation, the Prime Minister had never relieved me of my duties. Then, it was the Hung Kings’ Temple Festival. I planned to make it a big event. I came to see Quat and said: brother, you should make this a big event. You have just assumed premiership. You should make this festival a big celebration day. Quat said: Alright. I said: Could you afford 700,000 for the celebration? He signed me a check for 700,000. With that money, I could assemble 1,500 soldiers in three days. I went to Quang Trung Military School to talk to the lieutenant General whose name I forgot. That lieutenant General later became Defense Minister. He was in the same league with Le Van Kim. I forgot his name, such an easy name. Later, he kept in touch a lot with me. Do you know Do Tung?
LMH: Yes.
NT: Do Tung was his chief of staff. . . Later, when we have more time . . .
LMH: No problem, just go ahead and tell me what you know.
NT: So when I was Youth General Director, I contacted Quat about the Fighting Guard Union. I briefed him, but did not tell him that I authored the article. He said, Yes. I agree with the point you raised. Now, how do we proceed? I said: Please allow me to meet the American Chief Commander, and please allow me to say that I am your employee coming to ask him about this issue. This is the right time and the most favorable occasion to do this. He said: I agree. Please go ahead. The next day I telephoned the MACV office, then located at Pasteur street. Then, the Chief commander was General Stilwell, a different Stilwell from General Stilwell, who had previously commanded American troops in Burma. This General was only one-star General. General Stilwell was very courteous in his meeting with me. I briefed him about the Fighting Youth Guard Union, a force of 15,000 armed men, a legacy of Diem ‘s administration. I said: President Diem is already dead and now we are left with 15,000 men. He listened and then posed a lot of questions to me, all serious questions. I knew he was hesitant, thinking that these 15,000 men could become tools for the Youth Ministry. I said: This force will not be subsumed under the Youth Ministry. We just want to preserve this force, keeping it intact. We can change the name, and find a way to continue to train and keep this force. Previously, these young men had been trained and assigned to stay at their hamlets by President Diem. We would like to turn them into young men serving as eyes and ears for our government at the hamlet level. This is my goal. My thoughts are just that simple. And I think this would be most compatible with these young men’s capacity. Simply taking their rifles away would hurt their pride, their dignity. The communist can exploit that. The General said: Please give me some time to think about this, and then we will discuss this issue later. So I returned to brief Mr. Quat about the meeting. And then all of a sudden, the coup happened. One day, there was an American who came to see me at noon. Having been told, probably by some generals or his superiors about my contact with Prime Minister Quat, he said: I know you can contact the Prime Minister. Would you please pass on some news to the Prime Minister? I asked: What ‘s up? He said: The Generals are thinking of a coup. I think the Prime Minister should know ahead to respond appropriately. I said: That, you have to go to see the Prime Minister directly. I don’t have the authority to do this. Whichever contact line that you have with the Prime Minister, might it be through the embassy or other agencies, please use those contact lines to get access to the Prime Minister. I agree with you that I am responsible for a large part of a ministry, but this simply surpasses my authority. He smiled and said: Sir, we just came to inform you so that you can inform the Prime Minister. I said: Well, if you inform the Prime Minister yourself, then the Prime Minister would believe it right away. If I inform him, the Prime Minister would ask about the source of the news. How can I answer? If you can let me know the source of this news clearly then . . . The young American was dazed. After a pause, he said: you may say this is the special news from American Intelligence. I asked: So, why are you coming to me? I am not an intelligence officer. He said: I come to you because you have a relationship with the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister will take your words more seriously. I said: You are mistaken. I can discuss my responsibilities with the works that are carried out under his directions, but this is outside the range of my responsibilities. Please go directly to him. Then, the American was more revealing: Actually, we ask you to relay the news because we know you would not leak this information out. I said: If you go yourself, then the news is not leaked anywhere. Now you are asking me then if the news is leaked, I would be the one who leaked it. I would have to bear the consequences. The messenger did not know how to respond. He said: I am just requesting you to inform the Prime Minister. This is really important, perhaps to the Prime Minister personally. I said: If it is such an important matter, then it ‘s even better for you, or another person, to go and inform the Prime Minister directly. The American was very hesitant. When I took him to the door, he turned to shake my hand and then held my hand: Please help me. Please help me. You are a noble man. I said: I don’t know who you are in order to help. This is a very serious issue, an issue between governments. I am sorry I can not help you: No. Then he said, I am an employee of the embassy. I asked: So the ambassador sent you here? He said: No, the ambassador did not send me, but I can only say I am an employee of the embassy. Then he said: Goodbye now. If you think you can help the Prime Minister then please come to see him. His saying got me reeling! I did not say anything. After shaking his hand, I sat thinking hard for about an hour. I asked myself: Strange, why did this strange event get to me? There must have been something behind all this. Now, the Americans want me to inform Quat. I could not sort it all out. Finally, I told myself: Well, if this is related to Quat then let ‘s just go to inform him, get him to escape to some other place. So I came to Quat ‘s house that night. His family had finished their dinner. I drove my car all the way into his front yard. Since he was already the Prime Minister, there were guards in front of his house. I said: please inform the Prime Minister that I am a government employee wishing to report to the Prime Minister. The guard opened the door. I parked my car and came in. Quat thought I just dropped by to visit. He smiled and said let ‘s have some wine ready. I said: No. Some other time please. All the children were already upstairs, but Mrs. Quat came down. I signaled Quat that we need to talk privately. Quat told his wife: Darling, please come upstairs and rest. Mrs. Quat understood and left. When we were alone, I told Quat everything. Then Quat asked: “So, what do you think I should do?” I said: I could not assess the real situation. Why did an American come to me with such tremendous courtesy? I am not a high official or anything? Why did they choose to tell me and not you directly? I think it ‘s best if you just go to another place. Just for tonight. He asked: but where? I said: Please come with me. I will drive you to the Youth Ministry’s office. Nobody would know. Please tell your wife to get you some personal stuff such as your pajamas, your toothbrush … and also bring about 3000 dollars with you, just in case. Quat went upstairs and talked to his wife. A short time afterward, she came down with him. She said: Thank you. Please help my husband. We thank you for helping us. I said. Please don’t worry. This involves all of us. . . I drove him to the ministry ‘s office and told the security guard to open Kieu’s office. The office was a room with A/C and had a long, large divan. I told the guard not to say anything. We stayed the night there. The next morning, I drove him home. At his home, we had a discussion. I said, we should probably see ambassador Taylor about the incident on the night before. We should ask him about the news from the Americans that has forced you to escape. Quat said: I can not go. Would you be able to go on my behalf? I said: I can not go in the morning. He said: You can go in the afternoon. On the next day, about 7 or 8 pm, I drove to the ambassador ‘s private residence (If I want to assassinate him, it would be very easy then). When I drove my car in, none of the security asked anything. The entrance block was already lifted. I drove in slowly. There was an American walking on the sidewalk with his briefcase and his men. I also drove slowly in. He came in. I parked my car in front, next to the sidewalk and walked in the guest room. Nobody was there.
LMH: inside the ambassador ‘s residence?
NT: on Mac Dinh Chi street.
LMH: Yes.
NT: I went into the Guest room. The light there wasn’t bright, just dimly lit like this. I stood there for a while, then an American came and asked: May I help you? I asked him to inform the ambassador that I am the envoy of the Prime Minister and I request a meeting with him. He came inside and said something. A few moments later, there was a Filipino pushing a wine cart to the divan where I sat and asked whether I wanted a drink? I asked for a Scotch soda. He left after serving me my drink. I waited for more than 30 minutes, probably about 45 minutes and then saw a group of guests from inside walking out. It turned out that the ambassador was hosting his guests. I recognized two of the guests from the group: The first one Nguyen Cao Hach; the second one, Tran Van Tuyen. The light was too dim for them to recognize me. Nguyen Cao Hach definitely did not recognize me. Tran Van Tuyen probably might have. The rest of the guests were all Vietnameses. The ambassador had them over for dinner. Perhaps they had something to tell one another. The ambassador was seeing them off at the door. There were about six, or seven guests altogether. Tran Van Tuyen was definitely one of the guests. I did not know the names of other guests. When all of the guests had left, Mr. Taylor came over to me. I stood up to greet him and signaled that I needed to talk to him in private.
LMH: Have you met Mr. Taylor before?
NT: No. This was the first time. Hearing that I am the Prime Minister’s envoy, he was very courteous. I was wearing my informal Khaki uniform. He sat down next to me asking to go ahead with my message. I said the Prime Minister sent his greetings, and then I briefly told him about the incident. Mr. Taylor asked: So what are the Prime Minister ‘s wishes? I said: Mr. Ambassador, I have to tell you honestly that the current situation is too complex. And now we could not get in touch with any General. The Prime Minister would like to get in touch with the Generals, but he can’t. This is an abnormal sign. This is primarily the reason the Prime Minister sent me here to ask whether you have any source? Last night, we received the news from the embassy that something may happen to the Prime Minister. I myself had to drive the Prime Minister to another place for his safety. The Prime Minister sent me here precisely for that matter. Taylor did not seem surprised when I said the source was from the embassy. He said: I would like to invite the Prime Minister over tomorrow so we can further discuss this. I asked for the meeting time. He said 7:30am. I thanked him and left. He walked out to see me off at his door very politely. I went and briefed Quat. I said: I think the Generals are duking it out. You should be fine. Getting away last night was good enough. So the plan was to meet with Taylor the next day, but on that very night other things happened. That night, I myself had to drive Quat to the MACV’s office on Pasteur street for a meeting about military matters. It ‘s strange that when I drove Quat there, there wasn’t any American officer there. I just said we came for a meeting. None of them knew Quat was the Prime Minister. They just guided us to the meeting room. I look around and see the steel doors this thick. They had to open the doors for us to get in. Inside, the light was dim. Alexis Johnson sat there already (he knew Quat) to welcome Quat. Quat sat there. Johnson also sat. I did not know where to sit so I stood. Johnson had me sat next to Mr. Quat. I became Mr. Quat’s interpreter. Quat would turn to me if he did not understand and I would interpret. A few moments later, Westmoreland briefed Johnson on the military situation. As he was briefing, I interpreted for Quat. We had to witness the briefing to see that even General Westmoreland did not dare to hold back anything in his briefing. After listening to Westmoreland’s briefing, Johnson asked him various questions, and then turned to Quat asking: Mr. Premier, as you heard the briefing, do you have any question for Mr. Westmoreland? Quat (was perhaps only confused about his own situation.) kicked my legs slightly for my advice. I said: Please ask them with all these facts just presented, how would the American command make its decision? I said: please ask in Vietnamese and then I will translate, since it would be very awkward for me to translate when you say nothing. Quat repeated his question. I translated Quat’s question. Johnson told Westmoreland to answer. Westmoreland carefully asked the Premier to ask his question once more. I repeated the question. Westmoreland, then, responded: Our decision, as of now, is just warning and watching.
LMH: Warning about what?
NT: That was just his answer: -warning and watching. I translated his answer for Quat and then asked: Do you have any further questions? Quat said: Perhaps, we should stop. Their answers had shown that either they do not want us to know, or the truth was already too apparent. I responded: Please ask whether the situation now is very serious? Quat seemed hesitant and then asked in Vietnamese so that I could translate. Westmoreland was evasive once again: At this time, we did not make any definite decision yet, though we do have a few options. Then Quat asked me again: Do you think we should ask anything else? I said: No. Let ‘s stop here. They could not answer any further. We can see that the situation now is pretty serious. Johnson did not say anything then. He asked a couple more questions about the fate of those American units . . . And then the meeting was over. Johnson walked Quat to the door and I left.
LMH: What month was that, then?
NT: February, immediately after the 17th.
LMH: And how long was that after Mr. Quat became Prime Minister?
NT: A few days. Just a few days after. I remember Lam Van Phat led the coup. The next day Mr. Quat came to Tan Son Nhat to get on a private airplane to Bien Hoa to meet with the Generals. I saw General Stilwell seeing Quat off at the airport.
LMH: So what happened after you left?
NT: I left and that was that. . .
LMH: When did Quat go to Bien Hoa?
NT: Next morning. I picked him up at his house the next morning.
LMH: What did you and Quat discuss? Why did you decide to go to Bien Hoa?
NT: We didn’t. It was embassador Taylor. He did not say anything the night we came. He just said he would like to invite the Prime Minister over in the morning for discussion. Then we learned the news about going to Bien Hoa.
LMH: I am still a bit confused. You drove Quat home, then went to meet Taylor. Taylor told you to inform Quat about the meeting next morning. So when did Quat and you go to MACV’s office?
NT: Right on that night.
LMH: Right on that night?
NT: Right on that night. All of a sudden, there came an invitation for us to go to MACV’s office.
LMH: So on the very night you left Taylor ‘s residence, the MACV’s office invited you and Quat to meet with Johnson. And then the next day you and Quat came to see Taylor?
NT: We came to his residence the next morning. Then we decided to go to Bien Hoa after talking with Taylor. Let me tell you in detail: Taylor was very courteous in his meeting with Quat. Quat said, through my interpretation: I came here because I sensed that the situation is pretty serious. I tried to contact a number of Generals, but couldn’t. And I am very worried. Taylor said: Please come in. Quat came in, but I wanted to stay out to give them their privacy. Quat told me. Please come in. I declined: No. He might want to see you in private. Then Quat came in to talk to Taylor. Taylor could speak French. After a short while, Quat came out and told me: Taylor was able to contact the Generals at Bien Hoa and he wanted to know what we would like to do. I said: Then please tell Taylor what you need. You should go ahead of the Generals. You go there and tell them: I know what you gentlemen were planning, as the Prime Minister, I would like you all to tell me why this happened? That is your role now. Hence, Quat told Taylor that he would like to contact the Generals. Then General Stilwell arrived. Taylor told Stilwell: Please make the travel arrangement for the Prime Minister and this gentleman, his envoy, to go to Bien Hoa. Stilwell told Taylor: Please go to Tan Son Nhat airport. Your travel shall be arranged. Mr. Quat turned to me and said: Let us go. I said: No. May I suggest that you call the Prime Minister’s office and tell the office to get your car ready and have the two deputy Prime Ministers, Tran Van Do and Tran Van Tuyen, get in your car. You need to go with the two deputy Prime Ministers. Quat said: I can go alone. I said: No. You should not go alone. You need the two deputies next to you. That will shield you from all the criticisms later. I can not anticipate how things will turn out. Please listen to me. So, Quat turned around to request a call to the office. The car with the two deputies arrived 20 minutes later. To save time, we did not have the two deputies come in. Quat came right out to the car. Following the sitting protocols, I said: You sit in the middle with Tran van Do on your right, and Tran Van Tuyen on your left. I will sit next to the chauffeur. Quat told me: You sit in the back. I told him: Please don’t think about these things. You are the main man, not me. Please sit in the middle with Tran Van Do on your right and Tran Van Tuyen on your left. I will sit next to the chauffeur. Stilwell will be in the car ahead of us to lead the way. I told Stilwell: Please get into your car and we will follow you. When we got to the airport, the plane had not arrived yet. We stood in the personnel’s room. You know the personnel’s room right?
NDT: We walked inside where we could see the airplanes’ take off lanes. We all stood there. Stilwell and Quat both stood there. Quat told me to tell the driver to take his car back. I thought about it and said: Please do not dismiss the driver. You will be back here, and will need the car later. I ran out and told the driver to wait there until the Prime Minister returned. The airplane still did not arrive yet. Suddenly, we saw a Jeep wheezing by with 4 airborne soldiers on it. I recognized Lam Van Phat, and Stilwell also saw it. The jeep passed the personnel’s office, running much further down. When I recognized Lam Van Phat, I told myself: You guys met at Bien Hoa, Lam Van Phat was the only guy to initiate everything. That was exactly how it turned out. Stilwell was also very surprised, I was not sure whether he recognized Lam Van Phat, but he suddenly told us: It ‘s funny. It ‘s funny. . . Then the airplane arrived. It was an airplane, not a helicopter. Then there was a man stepping out. It was Lu Lan -General Lu Lan. He just stood there, perhaps, waiting for his next fly. Then Stilwell said: Gentlemen, please head to the airplane. There were only enough seats for Quat and his two deputies. If Lu Lan had not been there, then I could have gone. But with Lu Lan taking a seat, there was no room for me. No, I am sorry. Lu Lan was not there yet, but the airplane has only three seats available. Just enough for the Prime Minister and his two deputies. There was no seat for me, so I had to return. Stilwell turned to me and said: I am so sorry. This will never happen again. I smiled and said: don’t worry about it. He said, I will have a helicopter for you to get there. He made a call and then 20 minutes later the helicopter arrived. Lu Lan stepped out from the helicopter.
LMH: How can Lu Lan go on the American’s helicopter? How was he able to do that?
NT: I don’t know. Stilwell simply called a helicopter for me. After that he left. He did not care who was on the helicopter. That ‘s the pilot’s responsibility. Lu Lan walked out and then walked back on the helicopter. I got on and sat right next to him. The helicopter headed to Bien Hoa. Once in Bien Hoa, I asked the soldiers there for directions to the meeting place. The meeting had already started and the doors were already closed when I got there. The security guards did not let me in: I am sorry sir. If you had gone with the Prime Minister then getting in would have been no problem. Now that the meeting has started. We are not allowed to let anybody in. I waited outside for a long time. When the doors finally opened, Nguyen Cao Ky was the first to walk out, smiling broadly: Ah, ah. . . Mr. Tu, what are you here for? How did you know to come here? We shook hands. . . And then Nguyen Khanh walked out, then Tran Thien Khiem. . .
LMH: At that time, Nguyen Khanh was not in exile yet?
NT: No, not yet. Then, the Coup was in the making, but not carried out yet. The formal ceremony to get him out was only days later, with all that farewell to the army, taking a handful of earth from the motherland before he went into exile . . . All that happened a few days later. A short time later, the three Ministers walked out. Quat saw me. I just said: Please do not worry. Please go ahead. I will return and see you later. So the three of them again got on the airplane that took them there earlier to fly back to Tan Son Nhat where the car was already there to take them back to their office. As for me, I did not know how to get back yet. Suddenly, I saw Ma Sanh Nhon walking out. Ma Sanh Nhon was one of Nguyen Khanh’s close subordinates then. Nhon was my trainee before. Seeing me, he asked: “Oh God. What are you coming here for?” I said: “I am all done with my things. I need to get back to Saigon. How far is it from here to the bus station?” He said: “Brother. Please let your baby brother use his car to get you back.” He turned around and told his aid: “Please have the driver bring my car here, the province chief ‘s car.” When his car arrived, he asked me to get in and told the driver: “Drive this gentleman to Saigon. Drive him to wherever he requests and then come back here.” I was lucky that Ma Sanh Nhon was there to help me in time.
LMH: Was Bui Diem there that day?
NT: No. Bui Diem evaded everything from the beginning till the end. I will tell you more later: He evaded everything. At that time, he goddamned ran to Colman’s house. You know Colman. Don’t you.
LMH: Yes, I do.
LMH: Meaning?
NT: He hid there for a few days.
LMH: So Lam Van Phat failed in his coup attempt?
NT: Yes. Failed in his attempt. How did it fail? Was he arrested? I did not know and I did not see the need to follow the news on that. My mind was focused on Quat’s situation.
LMH: What about the next crisis? This is the first. You also bring Quat to Bien Hoa for the second crisis?
NT: No. We went to Bien Hoa only once.
. . .
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